

The MGIMO School of Government and International Affairs

INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION

Undergraduate Course Syllabus

Instructors

Mikhail Troitskiy, Sofia Melnikova

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This syllabus is designed in accordance with the MGIMO Educational Standard for the Bachelor's Program in International Affairs (program track *Government, International Politics and Law*).

Authors _____ Mikhail Troitskiy, Sofia Melnikova

Director MGIMO Library _____ Marina Reshetnikova

Rationale and design

The course aims to:

- introduce negotiation as a field of academic inquiry and practice;
- demonstrate how concepts and theories can be applied to the analysis of international negotiation;
- provide theoretically sound advice on optimal negotiating behavior in international, national, corporate, and other contexts.

Is negotiation more about bargaining or identifying a cooperative solution of a common problem? Is negotiation at all useful as a means of conflict resolution—as opposed to measuring up the potentials and sorting conflicts out through direct confrontation? How much should one be at all willing to negotiate in an antagonistic setting? When and why does negotiation start? Can you prevent your counterpart from walking away from your negotiation while at the same time influencing his interests and alternatives?

Once it has started, how much the sense of justice, identity, or culture is likely to affect the process and the outcome? How much influence on the solution may be exerted by salient points or focal principles (e.g. “split the difference” or “land for peace”)?

Can you make good use of your negotiation counterpart’s cognitive biases? What happens when the time for negotiating is limited and running out?

The course builds on the introductory Negotiation and Consulting course delivered in Year 1 and the Conflict Resolution course taught in the fall semester of Year 3. The course may also be offered to the first-year students in the International Business and Finance program as a comprehensive introduction to negotiation and conflict resolution

The course alternates lectures and seminars. Lectures are designed to introduce students to the key concepts and theories. In the seminars, we will consider specific cases illustrating the concepts and simulate negotiations to get hands-on experience of negotiating consequential international issues. The conceptual part of the course covers many types of negotiations and goes beyond international negotiation. The seminar discussions and game exercises focus on international contexts, aiming to demonstrate how knowledge of negotiation processes may help to confirm or question key theories of international relations.

Requirements

Students are required to attend all lectures and seminars, read the required literature, and prepare for simulation exercises.

Grading

Three mid-term tests covering readings and lecture materials: 20% each

Participation in discussions: 20%

Participation in simulation exercises: 20%

Course outline

1. What is negotiation? Why study negotiation?

Definition of negotiation. Negotiation as a form of *collective decisionmaking* vs *Negotiate to win*. Negotiation as a field of (formal) study / inquiry. What methods are used to study negotiation? Where does the study of negotiation fit within the body of IR scholarship?

Theory vs. practice, generalization vs. practical tips. Interdisciplinary study of negotiation.

Required Readings

Fisher, Roger and William Ury (1991) *Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreements without Giving In*. 2nd edition. New York: Random House Business Books. P. 3-14.

Zartman, William I. (1977), "Negotiation as a Joint Decision-Making Process," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 21, No. 4, pp. 619-638.

Additional Readings

White, James J. (1984), "The Pros and Cons of Getting to YES," *Journal of Legal Education* 34: 115-124. <https://repository.law.umich.edu/reviews/82/>

Hampson, Fen Osler and I William Zartman (2012) *The Global Power of Talk*. Routledge.

Seminar 1

We will discuss the evolution and practical applications of theories of negotiation. We will elaborate on the classical debates between theorists and practitioners of negotiation and introduce you to the key research questions about negotiation as a form of collective decision making.

Required literature

Zartman, William I. (1975) "Negotiations: Theory and Reality". *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 29, No. 1, An Era of Negotiation, pp. 69-77.

Chris Voss and Tahl Raz (2016) *Never Split the Difference: Negotiating As If Your Life Depended On It*. New York: Harper Business. P. 1-18.

Additional Readings

O'Neil B. International Negotiation: Some Conceptual Developments // *Annual Review of Political Science*. 2018. P. 515-533. URL: <https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev-polisci-031416-092909>.

Alfredson T. Negotiation Theory and Practice. A Review of the Literature / T. Alfredson, A. Cungu // *EasyPol*. 2008. 38p. URL: <https://www.fao.org/3/bq863e/bq863e.pdf>

2. Positive-Sum vs Zero-Sum Approaches. Distributive vs. Integrative Negotiation. Non-Negotiability.

The nature and risks of conflict and cooperation. Degrees of complexity in negotiated problems.

Can issues be non-negotiable (security?). Examples of negotiation failure.

Best alternative to negotiated agreement (BATNA).

Spiral Model vs. Deterrence Model. Negotiation Model as probing your counterpart's aims and power (BATNA).

The costs and benefits of "explaining" others their interests vs. "recognizing" their interests. Influencing counterpart's BATNA.

Side-payments as a means of shifting the game to positive-sum.

Required Readings

Fisher, Roger and William Ury (1991) *Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreements without Giving In*. 2nd edition. New York: Random House Business Books. P. 71-73.

Andrew Kydd (2000) "Trust, Reassurance and Cooperation". *International Organization* 54, no. 2: 325–357.

Stephen Van Evera. *The 'Spiral Model' vs. the 'Deterrence Model'*. URL: <http://web.mit.edu/17.423/www/Archive98/handouts/spiral.html>

Seminar 2

We will look at cases illustrating successful and unsuccessful attempts to change the opponent's interests, that is, to transform bargaining into collective problem solving:

- *Egypt-Israel negotiations over Sinai;*
- *USSR-France negotiations over the Principles of Cooperation document;*
- *Israeli-Palestinian peace talks;*
- *Indo-Pakistani conflict over Kashmir.*

We will discuss applications of the securitization theory to these cases.

Required readings

Waeber, Ole (2016). *Security—Negotiating the Limits to Negotiability*. Unpublished manuscript.

Telhami, Shibley. *The Camp-David Accords: A Case of International Bargaining*. University of Maryland. URL: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/6847/doc_6849_290_en.pdf

Additional readings

Samo, Elias (1976) "The Sinai Agreement and Beyond", *World Affairs*, Vol. 139, No. 1, pp. 40-52. URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20671653>.

3. Procedure vs Substance in Negotiation. International negotiation and domestic policy: two-level games.

Negotiation and legitimacy/longevity of solutions. Consensual procedure as a solution-legitimizing influence in negotiation.

Can procedural changes be used as a side-payment? How much relying on due process can solve the problem (e.g. "national interests" as a result of due-process negotiation among social groups)?

Deterrence and compellence through negotiation. Is it easier to refrain from doing something than to do what you have not been doing?

Signaling during crisis escalation: how simultaneously to show resolve to escalate further and readiness to compromise?

Do we negotiate with terrorists and why?

Required Reading

Fisher, Roger and William Ury (1991) *Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreements without Giving In*. 2nd edition. New York: Random House Business Books. P. 78, 86, 161-163.

Schelling, Thomas (1960) *The Strategy of Conflict*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 53-80 ("Bargaining, Communication, and Limited War").
<http://elcenia.com/iamapirate/schelling.pdf>

Putnam, Robert D. Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games. *International Organization*. 1988, Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 427-460.

Additional readings

Fearon, James D. Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes. *American Political Science Review*. 1994, Vol. 88, No. 3, pp. 577-592.

Janush, Holger. Audience, agenda setting, and issue silence in international negotiations. *Cooperation and Conflict*. 2021, Vol. 56(4), pp. 472-490.

Weeks, Jessica L. Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve. *International Organization*. 2008, Vol. 62, No. 1, pp. 35-64.

Seminar 3

We will discuss consensual procedures as solution-legitimizing influences in negotiation, and see how negotiation may be used to for deterrence and compellence purposes. We will look at

signaling during crisis escalation. We will illustrate the concept of two-level games using several cases, including the interplay between Israeli domestic policy and the Middle East peace process and the Bonn summit conference of 1978. We will also discuss the dilemmas of negotiating with terrorists and consider the case of the Teheran hostage crisis of 1979-80.

Required Readings

Neumann, Peter (2007) "Negotiating with Terrorists," *Foreign Affairs* 86 (January-February), pp. 128-138.

Hetherington, Lee H. Negotiating Lessons from Iran: Synthesizing Langdell & Maccrater. *Catholic University Law Review*. 1995. Vol. 44. Issue 3. P. 675-707.

Additional readings

The Iranian Hostage Negotiations, November 1979-January 1981. Georgetown University. School of Foreign Service. URL: <https://casestudies.isd.georgetown.edu/collections/conflict-resolution/products/the-iranian-hostage-negotiations-november-1979-january-1981>

4. Focal Points, Commitment, and Tacit Negotiation

Salient points: focal points and principles. Relevance of salient points to negotiation. The usefulness of focal points in solving coordination problems and highly antagonistic conflicts. The impact of focal points on the longevity of solutions. The power of salient principles: is it bigger than that of focal points? What happens if negotiators promote competing salient principles: how to win the "battle of principles"?

Sources of commitment in negotiation and conflict resolution. Why is it difficult to end conflicts, including wars, in compromise?

Required Readings

Fisher, Roger and William Ury (1991) *Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreements without Giving In*. 2nd edition. New York: Random House Business Books. P. 89-90, 184-187.

Zartman, I William and Jonas Brown (2019) "Focal Points and Salient Solutions," in: Schuessler, Rudolf and Jan-Willem van der Rijt (eds.) *Focal Points in Negotiation*. Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 77-101.

Dan Reiter (2019) "Why Negotiating Matters," *Asia Policy* 14, no. 3 (July): 169–191. https://www.nbr.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/publications/ap14-3_costs_brrt_july2019.pdf

Additional Readings

Reiter, Dan (2009), *How Wars End*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009.

White, James J. (1984), "The Pros and Cons of Getting to YES," *Journal of Legal Education* 34: 115-124. <https://repository.law.umich.edu/reviews/82/>

Jervis, Robert (1978). "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30, no. 2 (January): 167-186,
<http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/trachtenberg/guide/jervissecdil.pdf>

Fearon, James D. "Rationalist Explanations for War". *International Organization* 49, no. 3 (1995): 379-414.

Seminar 4

We will discuss practical application of the concepts of focal points, commitment, and tacit negotiation. The discussion of *Malta-Libya agreement case* is a part of a seminar, as it shows how We will look at how geographic factors (positions of the continental shelf and coastline) may offer salient solutions based on the concepts of precedence, status quo, equality, and proportionality. *The case of Israeli-Palestinian* peace process shows why focal points may have insufficient cogency, but at the same time suggests that basic tacit signals can increase the possibility of reaching an agreement. In addition, *the Cold War and MAD* case discussion provides a clear illustration of the importance of focal point coordination.

Required readings

Troitskiy, Mikhail (2019) "Focal Points in Arms Control," in: *Focal Points in Negotiation*, ed. by Rudolf Schuessler and Jan-Willem van der Rijt. Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 103-122.

Shlaim, Avi (2005) "The rise and fall of the Oslo Peace Process", in: Louise Fawcett ed., *International Relations of the Middle East*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 241-261.

URL:

<https://users.ox.ac.uk/~ssfc0005/The%20Rise%20and%20Fall%20of%20the%20Oslo%20Peace%20Process.html>

Wlosowicz, Z. (1985) "The Malta/Libya Case: Shelf Delimitation by the Distance Principle and How to Influence Decisions without Intervening", *Cambridge Law Journal*, Vol. 44, No. 3, pp. 341-345.

Additional readings

Makovsky D. (2013) "A Threshold Test for Both Sides If Peace Has a Chance," Washington Institute for Near East Policy. URL: <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/threshold-test-both-sides-if-peace-has-chance>

5. Psychological Bias in Negotiation

The concepts of «self» and «other» in international conflicts. The nature of cognitive biases and stereotypes as main obstacles and facilitators in negotiation. How does enemy image develop and how is it affected by negotiation?

How to distinguish between emotion-driven or rational motives in negotiation?

“War fever” and “negotiator myopia.”

Required Readings

Robert Jervis (2017) *Perception and Misperception in International Relations* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Preface to the second edition. P. xiii-xc.

Daniel Kahneman and Jonathan Renshon (2007) “Why Hawks Win”. *Foreign Policy*, no. 158: 34–38.

Nicholas D. Wright (2015) “The Biology of Cooperative Decision-Making: Neurobiology to International Relations,” in: Mauro Galluccio (ed.), *Springer Handbook of International Negotiation: Interpersonal, Intercultural and Diplomatic Perspectives*, pp. 47-58.

Additional Readings

Foster C., Mansbridge J., C. J. Martin. The Problem: Negotiation Myopia; The Solution: Deliberative Negotiation / Negotiating Agreement in Politics // American Political Science Association. 2013. P. 73-86.
URL: https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/dtingley/files/negotiating_agreement_in_politics.pdf

Dominic D. P. Johnson. *Strategic Instincts: The Adaptive Advantages of Cognitive Biases in International Politics*. Princeton University Press, 2020.

David A. Lake, Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Stephan Haggard, and David G. Victor (2017) “The Behavioral Revolution and International Relations”. *International Organization* 71, no. S: S1–S31. <https://ehb.ucsd.edu/pdfs/br.pdf>

Seminar 5

We will discuss how psychological biases affect the process of negotiation. We will see how misperception and a wrong assessment of adversary’s intentions can lead to negotiation failure (*Korean War*) and/or to a chronic stalemate in the peace process (*the 2014 Gaza War*).

Required readings

Mcalister, A., Wilczak, B. Moral Disengagement in “War Fever”: How Can We Resist? In: *Handbook of International Negotiation*. Ed. By M. Galluccio. Springer, 2015, pp. 33-47.

Hao, Yufan and Zhai Zhihai (1990) “China's Decision to Enter the Korean War: History Revisited” *The China Quarterly* No. 121, pp. 94-115. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/654064>

Bruneau, Emile and Nour Kteily (2017). The enemy as animal: Symmetric dehumanization during asymmetric warfare. *PlosOne*. 2017. URL: <https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0181422>

6. Justice and Ethics in Negotiation

Fisher/Ury’s “principled negotiation.” Durability of “fair deals.” Genuine vs. tactical uses of justice as anchor in negotiation. Criteria for choosing among justice principles.

Required Reading

Fisher, Roger and William Ury (1991) *Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreements without Giving In*. 2nd edition. New York: Random House Business Books. P. 72-74.

Welch, David (2014) “The Justice Motive in International Relations: Past, Present and Future,” *International Negotiation* 19: 410–425.

Albin, Cecilia (2019) “Negotiating Complex Conflicts,” *Global Policy* 10(S2): 55-60.
<https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1758-5899.12693>

Additional Readings

Marsella, Anthony J. (2015) “Reflections on the Cultural Contexts of Conflict Resolution via Truth and Reconciliation Processes,” in: Mauro Galluccio (ed.), *Springer Handbook of International Negotiation: Interpersonal, Intercultural and Diplomatic Perspectives*, pp. 287-296.

Troitskiy, Mikhail (2021) “The Next Clash of Ideas?” *Horizons: Journal of International Relations and Sustainable Development*, Iss. 18 (Winter) pp. 92-107.
<https://www.cirsds.org/en/horizons/horizons-winter-2021-issue-no-18/the-next-clash-of-ideas>

Seminar 6

We will analyze the role of procedural and distributive justice in negotiation and in the implementation and durability of agreements. The *Rwanda case* shows how false justice principles reflected in the agreement could lead to conflict escalation down the road. We will look at institutional justice as a condition for the regional acceptance of a global order using the case of *the African Union and protection of civilians*. We will see how justice became an important element in the *Iranian nuclear dossier* and examine the role of “sacred values” in frozen conflicts.

Required readings

Druckman, Daniel, Albin, Cecilia (2012) “Equality Matters: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 56, No. 2, pp. 155-182.

Fehl, Caroline (2019) “Justice and Peace: The Role of Justice Claims in International Cooperation in international Cooperation and Conflict”, Springer, pp. 3-29.

Druckman, Daniel and Lynn Wagner (2022) “Justice and Negotiation: Themes and Directions,” *International Negotiation*. 1-23.

Additional readings

Piccone, Ted (2019) *Peace with Justice: The Colombian Experience with Transitional Justice*. Foreign Policy at Brookings. P. 1-34. URL: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/FP_20190708_colombia.pdf

The Colombian Peace Process. Georgetown University. School for Foreign Service. URL: <https://casestudies.isd.georgetown.edu/collections/diplomacy-simulations-and-negotiations/products/case-346-the-colombian-peace-process-an-isd-international-negotiation-simulation>

Peace and Justice in Colombia: Finding a Balance after 50 Years of War. Harvard Kennedy School. 2017. URL: <https://case.hks.harvard.edu/peace-and-justice-in-colombia-finding-a-balance-after-50-years-of-war/>

Colombia's Peace Negotiations: Finding a common Ground after 50 Years of Armed Conflict. Harvard Kennedy School. 2017. URL: <https://www.hks.harvard.edu/featured-case-miami-dade-county-and-sea-rise>

7. Narratives and Identity in Negotiation

Narratives as a means of building trust and anesthetic essential for risk-taking in negotiation.

Does culture matter and how? Creating shared meanings in intercultural negotiation. Salient points defined by culture.

Required Reading

Hampson, Fen Osler and Amrita Narlikar (2022) "Introduction: Narratives, Political Identity and International Negotiation," in: Hampson, Fen Osler and Amrita Narlikar (eds.) *International Negotiation and Political Narratives: A Comparative Study*. Routledge, pp. 3-24.

Troitskiy, Mikhail (2022) "The Rise and Fall of Arms Control: How Narratives Impacted US-Russia Post-Cold War Arms Control Negotiations," in: Hampson, Fen Osler and Amrita Narlikar (eds.) *International Negotiation and Political Narratives: A Comparative Study*. Routledge, pp. 266-285.

Guy Olivier Faure (2017) "China in Central Asia: Negotiating Cooperation for Mutual Benefits?", in: Fen Osler Hampson and Mikhail Troitskiy (eds.), *Tug of War: Negotiating Security in Eurasia*, (McGill-Queen's University Press, 2017), pp. 53-68, URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1zrvhbm>

Additional Reading

Knopf, Jeffrey W. (2013) *Rationality, Culture and Deterrence*. PAASC Report 2013-009. <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA587339.pdf>

Seminar 7

We will discuss cases illustrating the role of identity and historical and cultural narratives in the negotiation process. We will look at reconciliation as a process of building common future through rethinking past relationships—one of the most complex and least understood types of negotiation. We will see how the right framing of narratives of past events that give

priority to voices of moderation can bring about negotiation breakthroughs (*The Good Friday of Northern Ireland*).

Required Reading

Larsson, Per (2011). *To understand the negotiations leading to the Good Friday agreement 1998. The development of integrated frameworks on negotiations theory*. Lund University. Department of Political Science, pp. 14-25. URL: <https://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordId=2275657&fileId=2275658>.

Sargent, N., Bartoli, A. "Psychological Dynamics of Insight: Relevance to International Negotiation," in: *Handbook of International Negotiation*. Ed. By M. Galluccio. Springer, 2015, pp. 59-73.

Mulvihill, Hugh, Mulvihill, Robert F. *The British-Irish Ethnic Conflict in Northern Ireland: A Case Study in Efforts to Reach a Settlement, 1973-1990*. Georgetown University. URL: https://casestudies.isd.georgetown.edu/products/the-british-irish-ethnic-conflict-in-northern-ireland-a-case-study-in-efforts-to-reach-a-settlement-1973-1990?_pos=6&_sid=ccc7ce63a&_ss=r.

8. Ripeness and Closure in Negotiation

What is ripeness? The pros and cons of the ripeness theory.

Sunset clauses in treaties (US-Russian arms control) and self-imposed negotiation deadlines (Iran nuclear program negotiations, Pope elections). How does negotiating behavior change during the closure phase?

Required Reading

Fisher, Roger and William Ury (1991) *Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreements without Giving In*. 2nd edition. New York: Random House Business Books. P. 174-175.

Zartman, William I. (2000) "Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond," in: P. Stern, D. Druckman (eds.). *International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War*. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, pp. 226-250. <https://nap.nationalacademies.org/read/9897/chapter/7>

Kydd, Andrew (2019) "Facing Impediments: Information and Communication," in: I William Zartman (ed.) (2019) *How Negotiations End: Negotiating Behavior in the Endgame*. Cambridge University Press.

Additional Reading

Troitskiy, Mikhail (2019) "When Is "Enough" Enough? Uncertainty," in: I William Zartman (ed.) *How Negotiations End: Negotiating Behavior in the Endgame*. Cambridge University Press, pp. 238-255.

Seminar 8

The seminar will focus on the practical dimensions of W. Zartman's ripeness theory and its modern variations. We will look at ambiguous solutions as a means of dealing with time pressure at the end of a negotiation. We will compare cases of effective and ineffective application of "hopeful ambiguity" in negotiations over *Iran's nuclear program, the status of Kosovo, the US-China Shanghai Communiqué, and UN SC Resolution 242.*

Required Reading

Troitskiy, Mikhail (2016). *Hopeful Ambiguity in Negotiation Closure*, PINPoints 43, pp. 47-50.

Kuperman, Alan J. (2022) "Muscular Mediation and Ripeness Theory," *Ethnopolitics*, 21:2, 163-177, URL: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17449057.2022.2004777>