

MGIMO University
School of Government and International Affairs

Syllabus approved
Dean, The MGIMO School of Government and International Affairs
Mikhail Troitskiy
« » 2018

Economics of Politics and International Relations
Undergraduate Course Syllabus

Instructor
Prof. Anton G. Oleynov

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This syllabus is designed in accordance with the MGIMO Educational Standard for the Bachelor Program in International Affairs.

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**PART 1:
INSTRUCTOR INFORMATION, COURSE DESCRIPTION
AND TEACHING METHODS**

1.1 General information

- Full course title: Economics of Politics and International Relations
- Type of course: Compulsory
- Level of course B.A.
- Year of study: 4th
- Number of ECTS credits allocated: 2
- Name of lecturer(s) and office hours:
Professor Anton G.Oleynov, Doctor of Science in Economics
Department of World Economy
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1.2 Course aims and learning outcomes

The course aims to introduce students to the foundations of economic analysis of politics and international relations and provide them with the skills to apply economic methods as an analytical tool for the examination of political phenomena. The course discusses the underlying economic assumptions and their theoretical and empirical implications in political analyses, makes familiar with the core economic conceptualisations of politics and international relations, introduces to the application of economic models in reasoning of domestic and international political issues.

Learning outcomes:

By the end of this course students should be able to:

- understand the core concepts and assess the core works in rational choice theory, behavioral economics, public choice theory, constitutional economics, international economics, international political economy;
- understand the logic of the interdisciplinary application of economic methods;
- understand the logic of economic reasoning of politics and international relations;
- describe the relationships between economics and politics;
- apply abstract ideas, concepts, theories, formal models to actual events and outcomes in appropriate contexts;
- deliver presentations to peers, communicate effectively in speech and writing;
- critically evaluate information.

1.3 Course requirements and grading plan

Course requirements:

Students are required to attend not less than 90% of classes and be prepared for class discussions. Conscientious reading of the assigned materials is compulsory.

Grading plan:

- Class participation - 10%
Students are expected to attend all the lectures and seminars and participate in class discussions; since the course is interactive, it is essential to read the materials for a day's class.
- In-class issue presentations – 90%.
Students will make three in-class issue presentations during the semester. Two of such presentations (up to 10 minutes) are performed by students individually or in pairs; one (up to

20 minutes) – in a group. The presentations will be based on the lectures materials and additional readings. Critical questions are to be offered for the class to discuss collectively.

PART 2. COURSE CONTENT

2.1 Types of work

Types of work	Academic hours
Total	72
<i>Total for lectures, seminars and written exam</i>	34
Lectures	16
Seminars	18
Written test and/or exam	
<i>Homework</i>	38
Preparation for lectures and seminars	38

2.2. Course content and readings by topic [template]

Introduction

Lecture 1.1 Economics as a Tool for Understanding Politics and International Relations

Summary:

Natural and social sciences: methodological distinctions. Fundamental principles of social sciences: methodological individualism and methodological holism. Key trends in social sciences: formalization of methodology and interdisciplinary studies. Economics as a social science and as a research tool. The timeline of the interdisciplinary economic research and its main theoretical tools: rational choice theory, game theory, property rights theory, social and public choice theories, economic imperialism, experimental and empirical economics, behavioral economics and neuroeconomics.

Economics at the end of XX century: the subject and the method.

Compulsory readings:

- Gwartney, J.D., R.L. Stroup, R.S. Sobel, D.A. Macpherson. 2015. Economics: Private and Public Choice. 15th Ed. Stamford, CT: Cengage Learning. *Ch. 1.*
- Philosophy of Economics. 2012. In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Available at: <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/economics/>

Further readings:

- Babbie, E.R. 2016. The Basics of Social Research. 7th Ed. Boston: Cengage Learning.
- Blaug, M. 1992. The Methodology of Economics: Or How Economists Explain. 2nd Ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mueller, D. 2007. Public Choice III. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. *Introduction.*
- Dow, S.C. 2012. Foundations for New Economic Thinking: A Collection of Essays. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Ross, D. 2014. Philosophy of Economics. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

Topic 1. Economics of Human Behavior

Lecture 1.2 Economics of Human Decisions

Summary:

«Homo-economicus» and its assumptions. Utility function as a formal tool in economic modeling of human behavior. Contradictions between theory and practice in economic view on human decisions (Ultimatum Game, Dictator Game, Allais Paradox). The concept of bounded rationality and its formal expressions (extended utility functions).

Compulsory readings:

- Gwartney, J.D., R.L. Stroup, R.S. Sobel, D.A. Macpherson. 2015. Economics: Private and Public Choice. 15th Ed. Stamford, CT: Cengage Learning. *Ch.2*.
- Levin, J., P. Milgrom. 2004. Introduction to Choice Theory. In R.Jackson and G.Sørensen. Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches. 5th Ed. Available at: <https://web.stanford.edu/~jdlevin/Econ%20202/Choice%20Theory.pdf>

Further readings:

- Gilboa, I. 2012. Rational Choice. Boston: The MIT Press.
- Rubinstein, A. 1998. Modeling Bounded Rationality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Available at: <http://arielrubinstein.tau.ac.il/br/br.pdf>
- Rubinstein, A. 2006. Lecture Notes in Microeconomic Theory: The Economic Agent. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Available at: <http://press.princeton.edu/rubinstein/>

Lecture 1.3 Behavioral Economics

Summary:

Current economic research on human behavior: Behavioral Economics. History of Behavioral Economics. Methodology of Behavioral Economics. Key areas of research of Behavioral Economics. Cognitive biases: types, examples, experimental confirmations. Application of Behavioral Economics in politics and its analysis.

Compulsory readings:

- Camerer, C., G.Loewenstein. 2004. Behavioral Economics: Past, Present, Future. In C. Camerer, G.Loewenstein, M.Rabin (eds.). Advances in Behavioral Economics. NY: Princeton University Press. Available at: <http://www.cmu.edu/dietrich/sds/docs/loewenstein/BehEconPastPresentFuture.pdf>

Further readings:

- Ariely, D. 2010. Predictably Irrational, Revised and Expanded Edition: The Hidden Forces That Shape Our Decisions. NY: Harper Perennial.
- Ariely, D. 2011. Upside of Irrationality Unexpected Benefits of Defying Logic. NY: Harper Perennial.
- Kahneman, D. 2011. Thinking, Fast and Slow. NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Internet resources:

- <https://www.behavioraleconomics.com/>

Seminars 1.4-1.5 Cognitive Biases

Summary:

Individual work or work in pairs:

1. choose 1 or 2 cognitive biases and prepare an experiment based on the available research on the selected topic;
2. organize the experiment in classroom (participants are the rest students of the group);
3. present the history and the findings of the academic research on the selected bias and consider how the experiment results comply with it.

Readings:

- Camerer, C., G.Loewenstein. 2004. Behavioral Economics: Past, Present, Future. In C. Camerer, G.Loewenstein, M.Rabin (eds.). Advances in Behavioral Economics. NY: Princeton University Press. Available at: <http://www.cmu.edu/dietrich/sds/docs/loewenstein/BehEconPastPresentFuture.pdf>

Further readings:

- Ariely, D. 2010. Predictably Irrational, Revised and Expanded Edition: The Hidden Forces That Shape Our Decisions. NY: Harper Perennial.

Internet resources:

- <https://www.behavioraleconomics.com/>
- List of cognitive biases: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_cognitive_biases

Lecture 1.6 Neuroeconomics

Summary:

Current economic research on human behavior: Neuroeconomics. History of Neuroeconomics. Research techniques and means of Neuroeconomics. Research areas of Neuroeconomics. Key application areas of Neuroeconomics. Application of Neuroeconomics in politics.

Key findings in Economics of human behavior.

Compulsory readings:

- Glimcher, P., C.Camerer, E.Fehr, R.Poldrack (eds.). 2009. Neuroeconomics: Decision Making and the Brain. Elsevier Inc. Available at: <https://www.hse.ru/data/2011/12/09/1259101786/Neuroeconomics.pdf>

Further readings:

- Glimcher, P. Foundations of Neuroeconomic Analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
- Reuter M., Montag C. (eds). Neuroeconomics (Studies in Neuroscience, Psychology and Behavioral Economics). Berlin: Springer, 2016.
- Wilhelms E.A., Reyna V.F. (eds.). Neuroeconomics, Judgment, and Decision Making (Frontiers of Cognitive Psychology). New York: Psychology Press, 2015.

Internet resources:

- <http://www.neuroeconomics.org/>

Topic 2. Economics of Politics

Lectures 2.1-2.2 Economics of Society

Summary:

Social phenomena as a subject of Economics. John Rawls “Veil of Ignorance” thought experiment and the economic answer to it. The economic origins of society. Social contract and its basic economic

elements. The institutional nature of society. Economic definition of institutions. The role and main functions of institutions in society.

Social processes: economic definition. Economic processes as an exchange of private goods and political processes as a provision of public goods. Types of public goods and economic nature of their distribution. «Public goods game». Institutions as producers of public goods. Conflict of individual interests in society. Institutions as a solution to conflict of interest. Institutions as a tool for achieving the social optima.

Compulsory readings:

- Butler, E. 2012. Public Choice – A Primer. London, UK: The Institute of Economic Affairs. *Ch. 10*. Available at: <https://iea.org.uk/publications/research/public-choice-a-primer>

Further readings:

- Brennan, G., J.Buchanan. 1985. The Reason of Rules: Constitutional Political Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Available at: <http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/brennan-the-collected-works-of-james-m-buchanan-vol-10-the-reason-of-rules>
- Buchanan, J. 1975. The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Available at: <http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/buchanan-the-collected-works-of-james-m-buchanan-vol-7-the-limits-of-liberty>
- Cabrillo, F., A.Miguel (eds). 2013. Constitutional Economics and Public Institutions. Edward Elgar Publ.
- Oppenheimer, J. 2012. Principles of Politics: A Rational Choice Theory Guide to Politics and Social Justice. Cambridge University Press.

Internet resources:

- <http://www.constitutionaleconomics.org/>

Lectures 2.3-2.5 Economics of Politics

Summary:

Politics as an institutional process. The institutional equilibrium and preconditions for institutional change. The costs of institutional changes. The types of institutional changes. The role of transaction costs in redistribution of wealth in society. The Coase theorem and its application in political context.

Politics as a collective decision-making process. Collective decision-making rules (unanimity rule, simple majority rule, plurality voting, runoff voting, Borda count and etc.) and their economic pros and cons. “Voting paradox” and K.Arrow’s impossibility theorem. Voting rules compliance with Arrow’s theorem. The causes of different outcomes in public choice. Cyclic nature of political process.

The efficiency of political process. The basic concepts of social efficiency (utilitarian, egalitarian, Rawlsian). The process of decision-making in politics: the analogy with market exchange. Democracy and federalism as factors of efficient political system. The economic role of freedom of information in politics.

Key actors in political process. Voters and their motivation in political process. “Choice axioms” and the factors determining voter’s motivation. Economic and non-economic incentives in electoral process. Interest groups and their motivation in political process. The indirect nature of interest groups participation in politics. The economic nature of lobbying. Politicians and political parties: economic goals and motivations. The economic origins of dictatorship. The economic goals of dictators and the dictator’s dilemma.

State as a actor of political processes. The economic role, functions and instruments of state. Explanations for the size and growth of government. "Government failures": experimental demonstration. The political role of state: normative and positive views. The government as provider of public goods for dominant groups in political process. Bureaucracy and its role in politics. Officials as rational actors. Strategies to enhance the functioning of bureau.

Compulsory readings:

- Butler, E. 2012. Public Choice – A Primer. London, UK: The Institute of Economic Affairs. Available at: <https://iea.org.uk/publications/research/public-choice-a-primer>
- Gwartney, J.D., R.L. Stroup, R.S. Sobel, D.A. Macpherson. 2014. Economics: Private and Public Choice. 15th Ed. Stamford, CT: Cengage Learning. *Ch.5-16*.

Further readings:

- Binder, C., G.Codognato, M.Teschl, Y.Xu. 2015. Individual and Collective Choice and Social Welfare. Berlin, Germany: Springer.
- Buchanan, J.M., G.Tullock. 1962. The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Available at: <http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/buchanan-the-calculus-of-consent-logical-foundations-of-constitutional-democracy>
- Lagerspetz, E. Social Choice and Democratic Values. 2016. Cham, Switzerland: Springer.
- Mueller, D. 2007. Public Choice III. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Oppenheimer, J. 2012. Principles of Politics: A Rational Choice Theory Guide to Politics and Social Justice. Cambridge University Press.

Internet resources:

- <https://publicchoicesociety.org/>

Seminar 2.5 Tragedy of the Commons

Summary:

The introduction part: the concept, examples, institutional solutions of the tragedy of the commons. Prisoner's Dilemma as a tool of analysis of the tragedy of the commons.

The practical part: analysis in groups (group (up to 5 students) of historical cases from Elinor Ostrom «Governing of the Commons: the Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action».

Workshop objectives: to know how fundamental social institutions being formed in practice; to see the historical examples of political solutions of the problem of sub-optimal social choice; to learn how to use the basic tools of economics in analyzing non-economic social phenomena.

Compulsory readings:

- Ostrom, E. Governing of the Commons: the Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. NY: Cambridge University Press, 1990

Internet resources:

- <http://www.garretthardinsociety.org/info/links.html>

Topic 3. Economics of International Relations

Lectures 3.1-3.2 International Economics and International Political Economy

Summary:

International Relations as a subject of scientific research. International Relations as a field of political science. Political science paradigms of International Relations: Realism, Liberalism, Marxism, Constructivism. "Cons" of the Theory of International Relations. International Relations and Economics.

International economics (IE): history of evolution and its milestones. Main subfields of IE: International Trade and International Finance (International Microeconomics) and International Macroeconomic Policy (International Macroeconomics). Key methodological tools of IE: theories of international trade, theories of international factors movements, theories of macroeconomic coordination.

International Political Economy (IPE): historical background and present stage of evolution. Interdisciplinary nature of subject and method of IPE. Key methodological tools of IPE: hegemonic stability theory, post-hegemonic theories, multi-level games, constructivism

Economic paradigm of International Relations: axiomatics, definitions, actors, types of relations. The concept of global public goods and economics of globalization.

Compulsory readings:

- Gwartney, J.D., R.L. Stroup, R.S. Sobel, D.A. Macpherson. 2014. Economics: Private and Public Choice. 15th Ed. Stamford, CT: Cengage Learning. *Ch.18-19*.
- Lim, T.C. 2014. International Political Economy: An Introduction to Approaches, Regimes, and Issues. The Saylor Foundation's Open Textbook Challenge. Available at: <http://saylor.org/site/textbooks/International%20Political%20Economy%20-%20An%20Introduction%20to%20Approaches,%20Regimes,%20and%20Issues.pdf>
- Ravenhill, J. (ed.). 2014. Global Political Economy (4 Ed.). N.Y.: Oxford University Press.

Further readings:

- Cohn T.H. Global Political Economy. 7 Ed. Routledge, 2016
- Frieden, J.A., D.A.Lake (eds.) International Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth. 5 Ed. 2009
- Krugman, P., M.Obstfeld, M. Melitz. International Economics: Theory and Policy. 10th Ed.. London: Pearson, 2014
- Pugel T. International Economics.16th Ed.. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2015

Internet resources:

- <http://www.irtheory.com/>
- <https://piie.com/>
- <http://ecipe.org/>

Seminars 3.3-3.4 Global Public Goods

Summary:

Individual or in pairs study and presentation of global public goods (GPGs) cases:

1. Choose one of the GPGs
2. Consider the following questions: a. Why the selected GPG is a public / not a private; a global, rather than a local good? b. How are the costs of providing the GPG spread among the IR actors? c. Is the existing mechanism of the GPG provision optimal? Why?

3. Make a class presentation of your answers

Internet resources:

- Ress, M.A. 2013. Global Public Goods, transnational public goods: some definitions. Available at: <http://keionline.org/node/1790>
- <http://reports.weforum.org/global-risks-2016/>
- <https://www.globalpolicy.org/>

Further readings:

- Bodansky, D. 2012. What's in a Concept? Global Public Goods, International Law, and Legitimacy. *European Journal of International Law*, Vol. 23 (3). Available at: <http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/content/23/3/651.full>

Seminar 3.5 Closing session

Summary:

Discussion on:

- International relations as economic and political processes;
- Economic nature and the role of international institutions;
- Institutional changes in international relations;
- Global processes as a subject of economic analysis of international relations.

2.3. Exam Questions

1. The methodology of the social sciences: the current trends. Economics as a social science: the subject and the method.
2. Theoretical framework of economics of politics: rational choice theory, game theory, the theory of property rights (subjects, methods, contributors).
3. Theoretical framework of economics of politics: social choice and public choice theories, constitutional economics, economic imperialism (subjects, methods, contributors).
4. Empirical and experimental economics and the use of applied economics in the analysis of politics.
5. The economics of human decision-making. The concepts of full/perfect rationality and bounded rationality. The contradictions between theory and practice in economic view on human decisions.
6. Current economic research on human behavior: behavioral economics (subject, method, areas of research). Cognitive biases: types, examples, experimental confirmations.
7. Current economic research on human behavior: neuroeconomics (background, research techniques, research areas, theoretical results). Key application areas of neuroeconomics.
8. The economic origins of society. Social contract and its basic economic elements. The institutional nature of society.
9. Economics of social processes: exchange of private goods and provision of public goods. Types of public goods and economic nature of their distribution.
10. Conflict of individual interests in society and its institutional solutions. Institutions as a tool for achieving the social optima.
11. The Tragedy of the Commons: the concept, examples, institutional solutions. Prisoner's Dilemma as a tool of analysis of the Tragedy of the Commons

12. Politics as an institutional process: the preconditions for institutional reforms. The types of institutional changes. The role of transaction costs in redistribution of wealth in society.
13. Politics as a collective decision-making process. Collective decision-making rules and their economic pros and cons. "Voting paradox" and K.Arrow's impossibility theorem. Voting rules compliance with Arrow's theorem.
14. Democracy and federalism as factors of efficient political system.
15. The actors in political decision-making process: voters and their motivation in political process. "Choice axioms" and the factors determining voter's motivation. Economic and non-economic incentives in electoral process.
16. The actors in political decision-making process: interest groups and their motivation in political process. The indirect nature of interest groups participation in politics. The economic nature of lobbying.
17. The actors in political decision-making process: politicians and political parties and their economic goals and motivations.
18. The economic origins of dictatorship. The economic goals of dictators and the dictator's dilemma.
19. The economic role of state. Explanations for the size and growth of government. "Government failures".
20. The political role of state: normative and positive views. The government as provider of public goods for dominant groups in political process.
21. Bureaucracy and its role in politics. Officials as rational actors. Strategies to enhance the functioning of bureau.
22. International relations as a subject of scientific research. International relations as a field of political science. Political science paradigms of international relations: Realism, Liberalism, Marxism, Constructivism.
23. International economics (IE): history of evolution and its milestones. Main subfields of IE and its key methodological tools.
24. International political economy (IPE): historical background and present stage of evolution. Interdisciplinary nature of subject and method of IPE. Key methodological tools of IPE.
25. Economic paradigm of International relations: axiomatics, definitions, actors, types.
26. The concept of global public goods and economics of globalization.

2.4. Exam timing

- Last week of December

2.5. Consolidated reading list (in alphabetic order)

Compulsory readings:

- Butler, E. 2012. Public Choice – A Primer. London, UK: The Institute of Economic Affairs. Available at: <https://iea.org.uk/publications/research/public-choice-a-primer>
- Gwartney, J.D., R.L. Stroup, R.S. Sobel, D.A. Macpherson. 2015. Economics: Private and Public Choice. 15th Ed. Stamford, CT: Cengage Learning.
- Lim, T.C. 2014. International Political Economy: An Introduction to Approaches, Regimes, and Issues. The Saylor Foundation's Open Textbook Challenge. Available at:

<http://saylor.org/site/textbooks/International%20Political%20Economy%20-%20An%20Introduction%20to%20Approaches,%20Regimes,%20and%20Issues.pdf>

- Ravenhill, J. (ed.). 2014. Global Political Economy (4 Ed.). N.Y.: Oxford University Press.

Further readings:

- Ariely, D. 2010. Predictably Irrational, Revised and Expanded Edition: The Hidden Forces That Shape Our Decisions. NY: Harper Perennial.
- Ariely, D. 2011. Upside of Irrationality Unexpected Benefits of Defying Logic. NY: Harper Perennial.
- Babbie, E.R. 2016. The Basics of Social Research. 7th Ed. Boston: Cengage Learning.
- Binder, C., G.Codognato, M.Teschl, Y.Xu. 2015. Individual and Collective Choice and Social Welfare. Berlin, Germany: Springer.
- Blaug, M. 1992. The Methodology of Economics: Or How Economists Explain. 2nd Ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bodansky, D. 2012. What's in a Concept? Global Public Goods, International Law, and Legitimacy. European Journal of International Law, Vol. 23 (3). Available at: <http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/content/23/3/651.full>
- Brennan, G., J.Buchanan. 1985. The Reason of Rules: Constitutional Political Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Available at: <http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/brennan-the-collected-works-of-james-m-buchanan-vol-10-the-reason-of-rules>
- Buchanan, J. 1975. The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Available at: <http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/buchanan-the-collected-works-of-james-m-buchanan-vol-7-the-limits-of-liberty>
- Buchanan, J.M., G.Tullock. 1962. The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Available at: <http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/buchanan-the-calculus-of-consent-logical-foundations-of-constitutional-democracy>
- Cabrillo, F., A.Miguel (eds). 2013. Constitutional Economics and Public Institutions. Edward Elgar Publ.
- Camerer, C., G.Loewenstein. 2004. Behavioral Economics: Past, Present, Future. In C. Camerer, G.Loewenstein, M.Rabin (eds.). Advances in Behavioral Economics. NY: Princeton University Press. Available at: <http://www.cmu.edu/dietrich/sds/docs/loewenstein/BehEconPastPresentFuture.pdf>
- Cohn T.H. Global Political Economy. 7 Ed. Routledge, 2016
- Dow, S.C. 2012. Foundations for New Economic Thinking: A Collection of Essays. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Frieden, J.A., D.A.Lake (eds.) International Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth. 5 Ed. 2009
- Gilboa, I. 2012. Rational Choice. Boston: The MIT Press.
- Glimcher, P., C.Camerer, E.Fehr, R.Poldrack (eds.). 2009. Neuroeconomics: Decision Making and the Brain. Elsevier Inc. Available at: <https://www.hse.ru/data/2011/12/09/1259101786/Neuroeconomics.pdf>
- Glimcher, P. Foundations of Neuroeconomic Analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
- Kahneman, D. 2011. Thinking, Fast and Slow. NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

- Krugman, P., M.Obstfeld, M. Melitz. International Economics: Theory and Policy. 10th Ed.. London: Pearson, 2014
- Lagerspetz, E. Social Choice and Democratic Values. 2016. Cham, Switzerland: Springer.
- Levin, J., P. Milgrom. 2004. Introduction to Choice Theory. In R.Jackson and G.Sørensen. Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches. 5th Ed. Available at: <https://web.stanford.edu/~jdlevin/Econ%20202/Choice%20Theory.pdf>
- Mueller, D. 2007. Public Choice III. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Oppenheimer, J. 2012. Principles of Politics: A Rational Choice Theory Guide to Politics and Social Justice. Cambridge University Press.
- Ostrom, E. Governing of the Commons: the Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. NY: Cambridge University Press, 1990
- Philosophy of Economics. 2012. In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Available at: <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/economics/>
- Pugel T. International Economics.16th Ed.. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2015
- Ress, M.A. 2013. Global Public Goods, transnational public goods: some definitions. Available at: <http://keionline.org/node/1790>
- Reuter M., Montag C. (eds). Neuroeconomics (Studies in Neuroscience, Psychology and Behavioral Economics). Berlin: Sringer, 2016.
- Ross, D. 2014. Philosophy of Economics. Basongstoke,UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Rubinstein, A. 1998. Modeling Bounded Rationality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Available at: <http://arielrubinstein.tau.ac.il/br/br.pdf>
- Rubinstein, A. 2006. Lecture Notes in Microeconomic Theory: The Economic Agent. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Available at: <http://press.princeton.edu/rubinstein/>
- Wilhelms E.A., Reyna V.F. (eds.). Neuroeconomics, Judgment, and Decision Making (Frontiers of Cognitive Psychology). New York: Psychology Press, 2015.