

Current Trends in the Evolution of Statecraft: Comparative Russian and US Approaches

*Optional course offered by the MGIMO School of Government and International Affairs (SGIA)
in the Spring 2020 Semester*

When: at 4 PM every Thursday starting from 13 February

Where: Room U-038

*Lecturers: leading Russian and international scholars and practitioners specializing in foreign
policy analysis*

Course coordinators Dr. Mikhail Troitskiy and Dr. Maria Shibkova

This optional course is offered to undergraduate and graduate students at MGIMO. The course will consist of 16 sessions conducted by the leading of Russian and international experts on foreign policy analysis. The purpose of the course is to provide students with an additional instrument of foreign policy analysis—the concept of statecraft. The course will analyze statecraft from two distinct perspectives. First, it will compare Russian and US approaches to and traditions of statecraft and, second, it will focus on the use of new and emerging technology in statecraft and the consequences of such use for international security and US-Russia relations. During fourteen sessions out of sixteen, MGIMO faculty members and invited experts will discuss the various aspects of US and Russian views of statecraft and the two sides' perspectives on the role of new technology—such as nuclear, missile, cyber, remote sensing, artificial intelligence, etc.—in achieving foreign policy objectives. The remaining two sessions will be dedicated to an online game simulation exercise.

The course is taught fully in English and is carried out in parallel with a similar course delivered in the Spring 2020 Semester at the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology (GaTech). MGIMO students will have access to the video recordings of the lectures and seminars in the GaTech course.

In this course, we understand statecraft as purposeful activity in pursuit of a nation's foreign policy agenda. Statecraft is not strategy—a pathway to achieving pre-meditated objectives—but a pattern of action that a certain nation prefers to resort to when faced with a problem or opportunity in its foreign relations. This pattern includes a combination of instruments of choice, negotiation tactics, forms of preferred agreements and their implementation as well as the level of ambition in foreign policy.

According to American political economist Daniel Drezner, the paradox of statecraft is that statecraft often generates resistance and blowback, complicating the actual achievement of desired outcomes, because the targeted nation's resolve not to cave becomes stronger if it expects intensifying conflict with its adversary. And yet, nations seek to improve their means of statecraft and actively explore opportunities to expand the range of those means by harnessing new and emerging technology. That sometimes generates statecraft scares: nations overreact while hedging against the risks of new technology being weaponized against them by their potential or actual adversaries. As a result, concerns about the possible use of an emerging impactful technology for statecraft purposes can poison relations between states, give rise to conflict narratives, and even lead to escalation of

existing disputes. The US-Russia relationship has been prone to statecraft scares over much of its post-Cold War history.

But how much are these scares warranted and unavoidable? Is new technology only giving a boost to offense, or can technological progress instead help to advance stability and cooperation? What is the actual promise that emerging technologies carry for statecraft? Are they strategic or tactical, that is, can they only be used for surprise maneuvers or for reassurance and other longer games as well? Can they make deterrence more effective?

Lecturers in this course will also seek to establish whether the United States and Russia have distinct preferences for means and patterns of statecraft and what these preferences may depend upon: national power, structure of the system, nature of relations with other nations, etc.

Required readings are available in the Dropbox folder at <https://www.dropbox.com/sh/6g3f34yrjrg1rnf/AABRnlF4MNZoBjApzWfuFb8-a?dl=0> . Students registered to attend the course will have access to the video recordings of the lectures delivered in the parallel course taught at the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at Georgia Tech in January-April.

Credit for the course will be given on the basis of attendance and participation in discussions (40 percent of the grade, only two classes may be missed), a position paper discussing one of the videotaped Georgia Tech lectures (around 1,000 words, 30 percent of the final grade), and a final essay on the topic of interest to the student (around 2,500 words, topic to be approved by the course coordinators, 30 percent of the grade).

Each instructor will aim to speak for 50 to 60 minutes and leave enough time for discussion. Students are expected to read the required materials before the class. ***Throughout the course MGIMO and Georgia Tech students will be practicing statecraft using the models provided by the online platform Statecraftsims (statecraftsims.com). In addition, during the two concluding sessions, the students will take part in a simulation exercise modeling a situation that would require developing a plan for the use of chosen means of statecraft in response to a foreign policy crisis.***

Course Schedule

Week 1 (**February 13**): Theories and concepts of statecraft
Mikhail Troitskiy, MGIMO

How do states define and achieve their goals and conduct foreign policy? What is the analytical value of the concept of statecraft? Statecraft vs. strategy; statecraft and the security dilemma. In what domains does statecraft occur, and what are the mechanisms of statecraft available to states? Does it make sense to distinguish between national “traditions of statecraft”?

Required Readings

Безруков А. Многомерная война и новая оборонная стратегия // *Россия в глобальной политике*. 2014. № 4. <https://globalaffairs.ru/number/Mnogomernaya-voina-i-novaya-oboronnaya-strategiya-17101> (skip if you do not read Russian)

Henrik Breitenbauch and Niels Byrjalsen, "Subversion, Statecraft and Liberal Democracy." *Survival*, 61:4 (2019), 31-41.

Francis J. Gavin, "Thinking Historically: A Guide to Strategy and Statecraft," <https://warontherocks.com/2019/11/thinking-historically-a-guide-for-strategy-and-statecraft/>

Mikhail Troitskiy, *Statecraft Overachievement: Source of Scares in U.S. Russian Relations*, PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo 619, October 2019, <http://www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/statecraft-overachievement-sources-scares-us-russian-relations>

Week 2 (**February 20**): Sanctions as Statecraft
Ivan Timofeev, Russian International Affairs Council

The purpose of the workshop is to demonstrate different dimensions of sanctions' efficiency as a foreign policy tool. While the literature on sanctions is full of skepticism on their use as a mean to change a target-country behavior, there are several domains where sanctions may be extremely functional. One of them - is the use of enforcement actions against international business. While sanctions are limited against states, they are capable to change behavior of the U.S. and foreign companies in order to comply with the U.S. sanctions' regulations. We will analyze how the "kitchen" of enforcement works. An empirical basis for the workshop is a database on the U.S. recent enforcement actions. We will learn why do companies violate the legislation, what does the U.S. government do to address the issue, what are the consequences for the companies and how do they change their behavior afterwards. This specific domain of sanctions' policy will be presented in the context of the overall theoretical and political debate on the use of sanctions in the international politics by the U.S., the E.U., Russia, China and other players.

Required Reading

Report of the Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights, Human Rights Council Thirty-ninth session, 10–28 September 2018, <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G18/264/85/PDF/G1826485.pdf?OpenElement>

Cooper, Zack and Eric Lorber. 2016. Sanctioning the Dragon. *The National Interest*, March-April. P. 36-42.

Drezner, Daniel W. 2015. Targeted Sanctions in a World of Global Finance. *International Interactions*, 41: 755–764.

Timofeev, Ivan. 2019. Rethinking Sanctions Efficiency. Evidence from 205 Cases of the U.S. Government Enforcement Actions against Business. *Russia in Global Politics*, 8 October, <https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Rethinking-Sanctions-Efficiency-20213>

Week 3 (**February 27**): Russian Tradition of Statecraft in an Historical Perspective: Lessons Learned
Andrei Zagorski, IMEMO

What are the defining episodes for the Russian tradition of statecraft, and what are the lessons that Russia has learned and applied in its statecraft towards other parties?

Week 4 (March 5): US Statecraft Tradition
Adam Stulberg and Jenna Johnson, Sam Nunn School, Georgia Tech

Week 5 (March 12): Multilateral Diplomacy as Statecraft
Anna Zakharchenko, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia

The lecture will focus on three main topics:

1 - Definition of statecraft. Statecraft versus diplomacy. How does it apply to Russian foreign policy?

2 - Russian perspective on and posture in multilateral diplomacy. Methods and instruments Russia uses in its multilateral diplomacy and as a member of the UN Security Council, OSCE, CSTO, CIS, EEU, SCO and BRICS; in its relations with such multilateral organizations as EU and NATO.

3 - Connectivity, e-diplomacy, new technologies, social media – how the Russian foreign policy uses them and how they could change the face of multilateral diplomacy.

Required Readings

Foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation 2016
https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICk6BZ29/content/id/2542248

Grushko, Alexander. The end of multilateral diplomacy? Russian International Affairs Council.
<https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/comments/the-end-of-multilateral-diplomacy/>

Lavrov, Sergey. Remarks and answers to media questions at a news conference on the results of Russian diplomacy in 2018 – remarks only https://washington.mid.ru/en/press-centre/news/foreign_minister_sergey_lavrov_s_remarks_and_answers_to_media_questions_at_a_news_conference_on_the_/

Week 6 (March 19): Economic and Financial Statecraft in International Politics and Russian Foreign Policy
Evgeny Nadorshin, Capital Consultants, Moscow

Week 7 (March 26): Foreign Policy Making in Presidential and Parliamentary Republics: Comparing Russia and Italy
Camilla Pagani, Sciences Po, Paris and Milan University TBC

Week 8 (April 2): Military Force as a Means of Statecraft (including emerging military technology: space / sensing, missile defense etc.)
Vasiliy Kashin, Higher School of Economics and Russian Academy of Sciences

Week 9 (April 9): Statecraft & Religion: the historical and contemporary roles of religious Proselytism
Chris Korten, MGIMO

Religion as an aspect of Statecraft is not an unknown concept but neither has it been covered in depth. This lecture will focus on one aspect of religion, that of proselytizing or converting non-believers; it will look at the roles that proselytizing has played historically as well as today in forming political policy. Charting the historical evolution of this aspect of religion within statecraft across the globe should provide insights into its future roles.

Required Reading

Jonathan Fox, “Religion as an Overlooked Element of International Relations”, *International Studies Review*, Vol. 3, No. 3 (Autumn, 2001), pp. 53-73.

Week 10 (**April 16**): IT and Cybersecurity in Statecraft **Oleg Shakirov, PIR Center**

From the international relations perspective, information or cyberspace may be considered one of the domains where actors engage with one another while pursuing their interests. Its novelty, interconnectedness, ambiguity makes it an uncharted territory for states. It remains an open question what constitutes statecraft in this domain. States collectively define this through a) using cyber capabilities vis-à-vis one another; b) advocating and negotiating norms that should govern this domain; and c) shaping, inter alia through national regulation, the boundaries of cyberspace. By doing so states seek to decrease uncertainty inherent to cyberspace and more closely associate these activities with traditional statecraft.

Required Reading

Nye, Joseph, *Cyber Power*, Belfer Center, 2010, pp. 1-8,
<https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/cyber-power.pdf>

Kollars, Nina, Schneider, Jacquelyn, *Defending Forward: The 2018 Cyber Strategy Is Here*, Lawfare, September 20, 2018, <https://warontherocks.com/2018/09/defending-forward-the-2018-cyber-strategy-is-here/>

Chernenko, Elena, *Russia’s Cyber Diplomacy in Popescu, Nicu, Stanislav Secrieru (eds.), Hacks, leaks and disruptions Russian cyber strategies*, EUISS, October 2018, pp. 43-49,
https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/CP_148.pdf

Tikk-Ringas, Eneken, *International Cyber Norms Dialogue as an Exercise of Normative Power*, ICT4Peace, 2017, <https://ict4peace.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Tikk-Normative-Power.pdf>

Griffiths, James, *Governments are rushing to regulate the internet. Users could end up paying the price*, CNN, April 8, 2019, <https://edition.cnn.com/2019/04/08/uk/internet-regulation-uk-australia-intl-gbr/index.html>

Week 11 (**April 23**): Linguistic Aspects of Statecraft **Andrey Baykov, MGIMO**

Week 12 (**April 30**): Energy and Natural Resources as Means of Statecraft

Sergey Golunov, IMEMO Russian Academy of Sciences

Global energy policy is largely rational and is not shaped by ideology to a significant extent. The lecture will argue that Russia and the USA have more divergent than common energy-related interests: while Russia is a pronounced energy producer and seller, the U.S. policy is shaped more by the interests of consumption than production, such as keeping global oil prices sufficiently low. The lecture will discuss the means that Russia and the USA have (e.g. means to influence prices, transportation systems, and political and economic powers to be used for energy coalitions building) and the ways in which such means are used.

Required Reading

Mohaptra, Nalin 'Energy Security and Russia's Foreign Policy,' CRP Working Paper Series, Working Paper no 11, *University of Cambridge*, May 2013, <https://www.crp.polis.cam.ac.uk/documents/working-papers/crp-working-paper-11-mohaptra-energy-security-russ.pdf>

Oxford Energy Institute, 'What's next for US energy policy?' *Forum*, 2017, Issue 111, <https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/OEF-111.pdf>
Proedrou, Filippos 'Russian Energy Policy and Structural Power in Europe,' *Europe-Asia Studies*, 70 1 (2018), pp. 75-89.

Week 13 (**May 7**): Status as a Means and an End in Statecraft

Igor Istomin, MGIMO

The modern interstate system is defined on the one hand by deep sociality and on the other by their significant inequalities among actors. This gives prominence to concerns regarding status acknowledgement in international politics. Status is usually understood as a recognition of an individual state within international community, emerging from collective assessments by other actors. It is closely related to the matters of standing, esteem, prestige, honor and reputation. Social recognition is seen as one of the primary reasons behind militarized disputes. However, it could also lead to emulation and cooperation. Moreover, attribution of privileged statuses leads to important political and practical consequences for a state in question, affecting its long-term security and wealth. Thus, social standing is not only an aim in international politics, but also becomes an asset or a liability.

Required Reading

Larson D.W., Paul T.V., Wohlforth W.C. Status and World Order // Status in World Politics / ed. by D.W. Larson, T.V. Paul, W.C. Wohlforth. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014. Pp. 3-32

Larson D. W., Shevchenko A. Status seekers: Chinese and Russian responses to US primacy // International Security. 2010. Vol. 34. No. 4. P. 63-95.

Renshon J. Fighting for status: Hierarchy and conflict in world politics. – Princeton University Press, 2017. Pp. 35-74.

Week 14 (**May 14**): Conflict Management as a Means of Statecraft

Ekaterina Stepanova, IMEMO

Week 15 (May 21): Emerging Technologies in Statecraft: Autonomous Systems, AI / Machine Learning, Big Data

Dmitry Zubtsov, Sberbank Corporate University TBC

Week 16 (May 28): Online simulation

Week 17 (June 4): Online simulation